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This paper is both a theoretical and empirical discourse on the responsiveness of the bureaucratic 
norms of governmental response systems in the aftermath of disasters. It starts by discussing the 
contemporary context, i.e., the “Age of the New Normal” where unexpected catastrophic disasters 
increase in frequency and become more intensified, also seen to becoming an everyday staple of 
life that mankind must learn to deal with. It then argues that to become responsive and be able to 
restore normalcy immediately after a disaster has struck, bureaucracies must innovate. The 
challenge becomes complicated, however, when the bureaucracy itself becomes a victim. The 
paper summarizes existing knowledge based on current literature on the challenges and problems 
that the “Age of the New Normal” pose to Public Administration and how the latter respond to 
them. Second, it discusses the how the bureaucracy, idealized by Weber, serve either as facilitating 
or hindering factor during disaster/crisis situations. Empirical evidence is provided by showcasing 
four government agencies that prepared for the onslaught of Super Typhoon Yolanda/Haiyan on 
November 8, 2013 in Tacloban City, Philippines. Lastly, the paper presents public service 
continuity planning as a tool that government agencies could use to provide continuous service in 
the aftermath of disasters.  
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THE CHALLENGES TO GOVERNMENTS  
IN THE “AGE OF THE NEW NORMAL”  
 
“The abnormal is now the new normal,” is how UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon (2012) sums 
up the global situation nowadays.  
 
The IPCC Special Report warns that climate and weather extremes are getting more frequent and 
powerful in the 21st century even though only 0.5ºC increase in temperature had been detected in 
the past decades since 1950 (IPCC 2018, 6). Thus, the “New Normal” is about “unexpected” 
frequencies and intensity of hazards. According to the same report, “the worst is yet to come” 
(IPCC 2018). Referring to the case of the totally unexpected power of Super Typhoon 
Yolanda/Haiyan (for brevity, this paper uses “Yolanda”) which struck the Philippines on 
November 8, 2013, experts warned that people have the tendency to relax in the face of 
unprecedented disasters because they rely on historical experiences of past disasters, which, 
luckily for them, they survived (Myrén, 2015). However, such complacency, in itself, may 
aggravate the disaster. This happened to the people in the affected areas of Yolanda, who did not 
know the meaning of “storm surge” and stayed in their houses believing that just as they survived 
the past storms, they would just breeze through it. As history tells us, around 7,000 in the Visayas 
Region died, the worst in the region’s history.  
 
The challenge nowadays to Public Administration in general, and the bureaucracy in particular, is 
to deal with the unexpected challenges of the “Age of the New Normal” i.e., disasters brought by 
climate change. The challenge is formidable because the bureaucracy – the offices and the people 
that manned them – are just as vulnerable to hazards as mankind. It behooves us to ask: Are 
bureaucracies, as idealized in the Weberian model, responsive to the challenges of the “New 
Normal”? What are its strengths and weaknesses? What mechanisms can be instituted to “prepare” 
for these challenges? 
 
To answer these questions, this article briefly reviews literature on how the challenges of the “Age 
of the New Normal” affect the bureaucracy. Second, it dissects the strengths and weaknesses of 
the Weberian model of bureaucracy in the face of disasters. Third, short case studies of the 
preparations of three government agencies, all based on Tacloban City, were written to find out 
the preparations they did before the super typhoon hit them on November 8. A full case study on 
a government hospital is presented last. The hospital was chosen for a fuller discussion because, 
paradoxically, it was given a national award in 2013 as one of the best government agencies, which 
provided medical services to surrounding areas in the past years. Yet, it fell victim to the super 
typhoon in spite of all of its preparations and years of experience in disaster/emergency situations.  
Lastly, the paper briefly presents the “Public Sector Continuity Planning” of the Philippine 
government in response to the need to prepare its bureaucracy to survive disaster after disaster so 
that it could recover immediately and render post-disaster services to victims. 
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BUREAUCRACY FOR EMERGENCIES: 
ARE THEY READY FOR THE NEW NORMAL?  
 
Rigidity in Bureaucracy: The Limitations of the Bureaucratic Model  
During Disasters/Emergencies 
 
In times of disasters, governments respond through what is sometimes pejoratively called 
“bureaucracy.” Max Weber’s ideal-type of bureaucracy is the model which most of the countries 
in the modern time have adopted. To Weber and other authors, the bureaucracy is “a general way 
of organizing human activity so that complex tasks can be carried out in a coordinated, routine, 
and efficient manner” (in Schneider 2011, 47). The five most common characteristics of it are: (1) 
clearly defined objectives, (2) a division of labour, (3) a formal structure underlying the process 
and tying together the various component organizations, (4) a set of policies and procedures 
guiding organizational activity, and (5) specialized training, expertise, and experience (Schneider 
2011, 47). These constitute what is known as “bureaucratic norms.” These bureaucratic norms 
work best in stable conditions. The bureaucracy will function as long as these are followed. 
However, Schneider argues that these norms will have to contend with “emergent norms” which 
come out during disaster periods. They are norms that structure human behaviour among the 
affected population that enable them to cope with the chaos brought by disasters (Schneider 2011, 
60). Its four basic components are: (1) milling, (2) rumour circulation, (3) keynoting, and (4) 
emergent norms. During disasters, people go to safe places to “mill” around with fellow survivors 
to search for meaning and appropriate standards of behaviour. Rumours, then, begin to circulate 
which could be malicious accounts of ongoing situations. Those ideas and features that are 
repeated, while others are discarded, are said to be the keynotes, which transform into emergent 
norms once they dominate discussions and adopted as new set of behaviour (Schneider 2011, 55-
57). 
 
Gaps between the bureaucratic norms and emergent norms develop when there is a difference 
between governmental plans and the needs of affected population or disaster victims. The rigid, 
impartial, hierarchical, and rule-bound bureaucracy may not be able to respond to their needs. 
First, the goals and objectives of the bureaucracy are defined by laws, policies, and procedures 
imposed by the government. Any deviation from them to meet victims’ expectations will be treated 
as unlawful actions, e.g., emergency purchases that violate the procurement law. Second, in times 
of emergency, government offices are not flexible enough to attend to people’s needs. The division 
of labour among agencies have to be respected and their expertise has to be trusted to avoid 
duplication of services and wastage of government resources. Third, the organizational hierarchy, 
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from top to bottom, has to be observed in authorizing actions and implementing them. In times of 
emergencies, this could spell a difference in evacuating residents or letting them become potential 
disaster victims.  
 
The gaps may continue to widen because of five factors. These are: (1) magnitude of the disaster, 
(2) degree of administrative preparedness, (3) level of communication and coordination, (4) goals 
of governmental response system, and (5) prevailing orientation and behaviour patterns of the 
affected populations (Schneider 2011, 61). The bigger the catastrophe, the more the government 
may not be able to meet victims’ expectations for speedy rescue, relief, recovery, and 
rehabilitation. The disaster preparedness of the government, guided by sets of procedures and 
protocols, may either not be followed during emergency situations or may not be congruent with 
the needs of the victims. Owing to the rigid hierarchies of government agencies, failure in 
communication and coordination is inevitable. Thus, government officials and employees may not 
be able to receive information and instructions both from the top and the bottom of the hierarchy. 
The changing or shifting goals of governmental response systems may obscure effective disaster 
response. If burdened with so many tasks through time, e.g. adding non-essential or unrelated 
tasks, disaster management agencies may find it difficult to pinpoint their objectives and priorities 
in times of disaster. Finally, the community or society’s values, culture, or thinking may either 
support government’s disaster management activities if the former is closely-knitted or make 
things complicated if people are uncooperative (Schneider 2011, 61-67).  
 
Other literature supports the contentions of Schneider. Learning from the dismal Hurricane Katrina 
post-disaster management, Takeda and Helms (2006) enumerate three failures of the bureaucratic 
approach towards disaster management. These are: (1) decentralized knowledge and centralized 
decision making, (2) ignoring outside information, and (3) commitment to failing courses of action 
According to the authors, the sharing of codified knowledge built within an organization whose 
staff became “experts” in their own right takes some time to be passed to frontline local 
governments. Moreover, actions which require approval from the central office of a hierarchical 
organization cause delay in disaster response. And, due to the inbreeding of knowledge within 
agencies, there is a tendency among personnel to ignore relevant outside information, which is 
defined as “as any information, individual or activity which is not currently part of a system, but 
relevant to the task(s) faced by the system” (Takeda and Helms, 2006). This usually happens when 
scientific data contrary to those the government agency generated challenge those of the latter. 
Instead of reconciling, government agencies might defensively refute alternative data without 
assessing its validity. The result may be that the agencies fail to take appropriate actions, to the 
detriment of disaster victims. 
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Public Service Continuity Planning: Helping the Government 
Provide Continuous Services in Disaster/Emergency Situations 
 
Disaster planning has been largely adapted and widely practiced for a long period of time. Whether 
there are natural, technological, contextual or human-induced hazards (Pine 2008c; Smith and 
Petley 2009 in Wasley 2013) that pose risks to the social, economic, and natural capital of a 
community, region or country (Pine 2008b in Wasley 2013), disaster planners have come up with 
counter measures to mitigate their effects. They have created emergency, preparedness, recovery 
and rehabilitation plans in the pre- and post-conditions of governments, business enterprises, 
communities and other social entities. It is only in recent years that they have popularized 
continuity planning in the public and private sector, following the September 11 terrorist attack 
(Savage 2002; Schneider 2011) and other real-world events that increase the awareness to prepare 
and take action (FEMA 2011). 
 
The U.S. Department of Homeland Security describes continuity planning as “simply the good 
business practice of ensuring the execution of essential functions through all circumstances, and 
[it is] a fundamental responsibility of public and private entities responsible to their stakeholders,” 
(USHSC, 2007). In the context of business operations, continuity planning serves as a proactive 
measure to ensure that critical products and/or services are delivered during a disruption. These 
products and/or services must be rendered for the survival of the business enterprise, prevention 
of injury, and meeting of legal and other obligations (A Guide to Business Continuity Planning, 
2014). On the other hand, continuity planning in the context of public service is a political 
safeguard to ensure an uninterrupted succession of the constitutional form of government in the 
face of any hazard that could pose threats to its constituents. It is integrated into the daily operations, 
functions, plans and mission areas of government departments and agencies, and simultaneously 
occurs with the development of their programs (USHSC, 2007). 
 
In the wake of the disastrous events that struck the U.S., the President George W. Bush’s 
administration pushed for extensive policies to counter terrorism and enhance national 
preparedness for disasters. In 2007, they issued a National Continuity Policy (NCP), which is an 
updated, integrated public continuity plan that aims to maintain a comprehensive and effective 
continuity capability for the preservation of their government and continuing performance of their 
functions broken down as follows: Mission Essential Functions (MEFs), Primary Mission 
Essential Functions (PMEFs), and National Essential Functions (NEFs). The MEFs are the 
government functions that must be continued after a disruption of normal activities in the 
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department and agency-level. The PMEFs, on the other hand, are the specific MEFs that support 
the NEFs before, during and after a disruption. They must be continuously performed or must be 
restored within 12 hours after an emergency, and maintained for up to 30 days or until normal 
operations are resumed. Lastly. the NEFs are the overarching responsibilities of the Federal 
Government to lead and sustain the nation in the aftermath of an emergency (USHSC, 2007). 
 
The four key pillars of continuity are leadership, staff, communications and facilities (see Figure 
1). All these components are significant during day-to-day operations but become critical in times 
of crisis (USHSC, 2007). 
 
Figure 1: The Continuity Policy Framework  
 
 
Source: USHSC 2007 
 
Leadership refers to the senior decision-makers that are in command of an organization (e.g., 
President, Cabinet Secretary, Governor, Chief Executive Officer, or manager). As supervisors to 
the continuity of operations, they are given physical protection (e.g., sheltering in a secured place 
or relocation away from the threat) in the imminence of danger. A prioritized list of designated 
successors is also accomplished in advance to ensure the survival of leadership. The successor 
serves as the “person to act for and exercise the powers of the principal in the event of death, 
incapacity, or resignation,” (USHSC 2007). 
 
Staff are the “personnel that provide [the] leadership advice, recommendations and [the] functional 
support necessary to continue essential operations,” (USHSC 2007). Like the leaders, they are also 
cross and vertically trained to continually perform their duties with their peers and with the person 
above and below in times of disruption. 
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Communications refer to the “voice, video and data capabilities that enable leadership and staff to 
conduct their essential functions,” (USHSC 2007). It must be durable and reliable substantially in 
times of crisis. It must also be interoperable so that public and private organizations are linked, 
and can receive and transmit important information. 
 
Facilities are the locations where leaders and staff perform their essential functions. There must be 
a designated facility intended for daily operations and alternate facilities for relocation. They must 
be sturdy and resilient, and must provide protection for the continuity operations. The leaders and 
staff may physically work in one facility or distribute in various sites (USHSC 2007). 
 
 
PUBLIC SERVICE CONTINUITY IN THE EYE OF THE STORM  
 
When Super Typhoon Yolanda, one of the strongest typhoons ever recorded in the Philippines 
with its wind speed up to 300 km/hour, made its landfall on November 8, nine out of the 17 
administrative regions in the Philippines were affected by its strong winds and the storm surge that 
came with it. This includes Tacloban City, which is considered as the regional hub of the Central 
Visayas region. The province’s eastern part was heavily damaged by the storm surge, which rose 
up to 6 meters high (see Figure 2). The fatalities were estimated at 7,000 and the number of missing 
persons at 1,800. Moreover, the number of damaged houses reached up to 28,734. Out of this 
number, 90% were along the coastline. Partially-damaged houses totaled to 17,643. Major 
damages were also sustained by all of Tacloban’s seven hospitals and clinics. 
  
The succeeding cases highlight the preparations of the government agencies against the incoming 
super typhoon, the losses and damage they sustained, and analyses on how their bureaucratic set-
















Figure 2: Areas in Tacloban City Affected by the Storm Surge 
 




Office of Civil Defense Regional Office VIII1 
 
OCD-RO8 is the regional office of the Office of the Civil Defense, which is the technical arm of 
the National Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Council (NDRRMC) in the Phillipines. 
The NDRRMC is under the Department of National Defense. Its primary mission is to “administer 
a comprehensive national civil defense and disaster risk reduction and management program by 
providing leadership in the continuous development of strategic and systematic approaches as well 
as measures to reduce the vulnerabilities and risks to hazards and manage the consequences of 
disasters.” OCD-RO8 is the extension arm at the regional level which assists local governments in 
the Eastern Visayas region in disaster risk reduction. It is headed by a Regional Director who chairs 
the Regional Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Council (RDRRMC). In 2013, it only had 
4 permanent staff that provided technical assistance to 6 provinces, 7 cities, 136 municipalities, 
and 4,390 barangays (villages) with estimated 4.10 million residents (as of 2010). 
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Preparations: From November 1-6, OCD-RO8 was busy meeting local officials to prepare the 
region for the impact of the super typhoon using the established disaster plan and protocols. The 
office staff were prepositioned to secure them from the risks of the typhoon. Then, in the afternoon 
of November 7, its director, Rey Gozon, met the NDRRMC Chairman and Defense Secretary 
Voltaire Gazmin who was accompanied by the Interior Secretary Mar Roxas who flew to Tacloban 
City from Manila. He presented the preparedness measures of the RDRRMC. He assured them 
that the typhoon advisory reached down to the barangay level. At 8:00 p.m., the director met again 
Secretaries Gazmin and Roxas for last minute updates and preparations. 
 
Loss and Damage: On November 8, the day the super typhoon made its landfall in Tacloban City 
in the morning. OCD-RO8 became busier with meetings and coordinating activities. However, 
after Yolanda left the city, the communication lines were disrupted. The office has only one 
satellite phone and no transportation/vehicle to go around the city for inspection. The office of 
OCD-RO8 at the Grand Stand inside the Leyte Sports Development Centre was damaged. Sensing 
danger for his staff, the director had them moved to another building (at the compound of the 
regional command of the Philippine National Police, around 7 kilometres away or 20 minutes by 
car) to continue their operations and secure the well-being of the staff. He tried to contact another 
high-ranking official of the Defence Department, but unfortunately, he could not get speak to him 
due to poor cell-phone signal. Without transportation, the director and some of his staff walked to 
Leyte Park to handover the only satellite phone to Secretary Gazmin who used it to communicate 
with his staff in the central office in Manila. In the evening, again, he had a meeting with the 
regional governor, city mayor and representatives of the city police force. 
 
Starting November 8, OCD-RO8 became busy with data gathering and facilitation of check-in 
procedures of various response organizations. Dir. Gozon met in the airport his boss. They 
immediately went to another nearby Municipality of Palo, another devastated area in the province, 
to conduct inspection. 
 
On November 10, OCD-RO8 assisted in creating task forces that would manage the cadaver 
collection, debris clearing and cleaning, health and sanitation, peace and order, and food and water 
distribution. From then on, daily meetings were held to force team leaders to report their 
accomplishments and prepare what needs to be done.  
 
Analysis: The law that created the regional offices of the OCD, which include OCD-RO8, provided 
for “hierarchical” (a Weberian characteristic) disaster response system because it allows 
hierarchical inter-local government cooperation in response to the damages caused by disasters. 
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For example, if a disaster covers several local units, the next higher-level authority that covers 
them is mandated to take over the rescue efforts. This hierarchical set-up is appropriate to deal 
with disasters that varies in terms of areas of coverage, and damage caused. Analytically, the more 
damaged area, the higher level of authority should respond because it has more financial and 
logistical resources for rescue operations.  
 
However, the experience of OCD-RO8 shows that without adequate service continuity plans, it 
became a glaring example of “first responders” becoming “victims.” Thus, it unable to effectively 
and adequately coordinate with 4,539 local government units in the whole Eastern Visayas region.  
 
On that fateful day on November 8, 2013, to its credit, OCD-RO8 did its best even though it had 
its hands full in assisting local governments in the region to prepare for the super typhoon. 
Fortunately or unfortunately, it got busier when high-ranking officials from the central offices of 
the Defence and Interior Departments personally came visiting who had to be attended to also even 
though the regional office only had a handful of staff (less than 10) at that time. Hence, it had 
hardly enough time and personnel to secure its office before the typhoon hit it. It also did not have 
enough satellite phones (the only one available was lent to the Manila official) and other 
communication equipment. Moreover, its office in Tacloban City’s Grandstand was severely 
damaged. Its employees complained about the lack of appropriate clothing to keep them protected 
during disaster operations; the lack of transportation vehicles that can be used in water and off-
road operations. The staff were not given hazard pay for the services rendered during disaster 
periods. Ironically, OCD8 was a disaster victim in itself which was temporarily paralyzed to help 
the region. And, it did not help that it relocated to a building in Barangay 88 in San Jose, Tacloban 
City which is both a storm surge and tsunami-prone area. The levels of administrative preparedness 
and communication of the OCD-RO8 at that time were all low for a high level of urgency to 




Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (Central Bank of the Philippines) Regional Office No. 82 
 
 
Background: The Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas Regional Office No. 8 (BSP-RO8) in Tacloban City 
began its operation in 1976 to bring central banking services closer to the grass-root level 
especially in the city being the centre of cash and commerce, culture, education, government, and 
tourism in the Eastern Visayas region. It serves the six provinces in Region VIII, namely, Biliran, 
Leyte, Southern Leyte, Northern Samar, Samar, and Eastern Samar. Its clients include 7 
commercial banks, 2 specialized banks, and 9 rural banks which transact with it in terms of 
withdrawals, exchanges, and deposits.  
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Preparations: As early as November 6, BSP-RO8 activated its Departmental Business Continuity 
Plan (DBCP) as an outcome of the emergency meeting it had on that day. The DBCP is part of the 
BSP Business Continuity Plan (BBCP) that emanated from the central office’s Business Continuity 
Office (BCO) in Manila. The DBCP of BSP-RO8 aims to: (1) restore critical business functions 
within the pre-established recovery time objectives and levels of service, (2) recover disrupted 
critical function within established and/or agreed-upon objectives, and (3) ensure availability of 
critical data/vital records. Following its plan, the regional office prepared food and water, and 
secured the equipment and premises.  
 
Loss and Damage: On November 8, the storm surge that entered the building destroyed the 
currency processing equipment, generator set, telecommunication (voice and data), vehicles, and 
some IT equipment. The strong winds damaged the roof deck resulting to water seepage to the 
second and ground floors of the building. All of its employees survived during the tragedy in their 
homes except for some family members who lost their lives in the storm surge. This was confirmed 
through word of mouth because their Call Tree cannot not be activated anymore with the damaged 
communication lines in the city. 
 
Recovery Efforts: BSP-RO8 was put to red alert status after initial assessment was sent on 
November 8 to BSP Regional Office in Cebu, which is only an island away. Relief goods and 
office supplies and equipment from the nearby BSP-Regional Office No. 9 office and the Manila-
based central office were dispatched. Below were the assistance provided by these offices: 
 
• BSP-RO9 in Cebu procured and shipped office supplies and equipment to BSP-RO8; 
• BSP-RO9 distributed relief goods from Cebu to the houses of the BSP-Tacloban personnel 
using an escorted armoured car which was intentional to conceal them from criminal 
elements along the way; 
• BSP-Central Office’s Human Resources Management Department facilitated the relief 
operations. All branches nationwide brought basic needs and sent them via C-130 airplanes, 
and food and relief items (in cash and kind contributed by all BSP employees nationwide) 
were distributed to all BSP-RO8 employees, whether permanent or outsourced.  
On November 15, the regional office received satellite phones from the central office. On the same 
day, its cellphone lines were once again operational.  
 
On November 21, 13 days after the visit of the super typhoon, BSP-RO8 resumed its cash 
operations, i.e., withdrawals of banks were serviced. The cash department head of the regional 
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office visited commercial and specialized banks to discuss with them their currency requirements 
due to communication system problems. Manual processing of currency was made pending the 
replacement of currency processing equipment that had to undergo government procurement 
processes. Cash transactions were processed manually. End-of-day balances and withdrawal 
approvals were sent via e-mails using Wi-Fi plug-ins.  
 
Analysis: The case of BSP-RO8 exemplifies government offices or the bureaucracy which are 
“bureaucratically” responsive in times of disasters. There was no “de-bureacratization” involved 
in the creation of regional office’s DBCP because it fits into the descriptions of Weber’s 
bureaucracies, i.e., with clearly defined objectives, and hierarchical response system. However, 
judging from BSP-RO8’s action to use manual processing of currency and other cash transactions, 
and the use of e-mails to send end-of-day balances and withdrawal approvals in the aftermath of 
the disaster, a glimpse of flexibility, which is not a defining characteristic of stoic bureaucratic 
offices, could be discerned,.  
 
The direct clients of BSP-RO8, i.e., 18 local banks in 2013, were not as vulnerable (to hunger, 
thirst, injury, death, etc.) as human beings after the disaster. The services of the regional office 
were not very urgent compared to those of the OCD-RO8 and local governments, which must 
come to the rescue of people in danger. Generally speaking, banks didn’t need food, water, 
medicine, shelter, etc. to survive on Day 1. However, the regional office of the BSP opened 
immediately to service the needs of the local banks whose depositors were disaster victims who 
needed cash to purchase basic necessities to survive. Its continuity plans assisted them to resume 
operations immediately which prevented prolonged disruption of banking services in the city.  
 
 
Social Security System-Tacloban Branch3 
 
Background: The Social Security System (SSS) is a government run social insurance program for 
workers in the private, professional, and informal sectors. It was established in 1954 through a 
national law (Republic Act 1161). It has branches in almost all of the local governments of the 
country including that in Tacloban City. The city branch covers establishments, commercial banks, 
and government offices under its jurisdiction. Its services include payment of SSS members, 
benefit claims, loan application processing, and registration of membership applications. 
 
Preparations: Days before November 8, SSS-TB Head instructed the staff to lock the office 
windows and wrap their equipment in plastic. All branch employees filed for 30-day calamity 
leave, which was approved by the field office of the Civil Service Commission. 
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Loss and Damage: On November 8, the first floor of the SSS-TB was submerged in water reaching 
as high as the ceiling. When the water came out, the whole floor was filled with mud. The office 
documents, furniture, and equipment were all damaged. 
 
Recovery Efforts: Three days after the visit of the super typhoon some staff from the neighboring 
SSS Calbayog Branch and the Senior Vice-President for SSS Visayas-Mindanao Group visited the 
SSS-TB. They delivered food and water, and assessed the situation of the branch employees. 
 
Twenty-two days after, SSS Catbalogan and Cebu Branches sent some of their personnel to set up 
temporary office in tents. The Catbalogan branch even provided skeletal staff to man the temporary 
office up to Dec. 10. 
 
On December 11, 33 days after, 21%-25% of the SSS-TB employees returned to service. They 
were reorganized by the branch head to cater to the work demands in the office while some 
personnel were still on leave. On that day, majority of the transactions were back to normal. 
However, they were only able to receive request but cannot issue SSS numbers and process 
transactions.  
 
On December 19, the SSS Main Office in Manila sent some of its Human Resource Department 
staff to conduct stress debriefing with the branch employees in Cebu, an island away from the city. 
 
In January 2014, the heads of the Branch Expansion, Information Technology, and Engineering 
and Maintenance Department from the central office came to help SSS-TB re-establish their work 
base.  Also, the HRD of the main office came again and conducted the second and final stress 
briefing of the branch employees. 
 
Analysis: Unlike BSP-RO8, SSS-TB had no continuity plans to show (during the interview). 
However, to its credit, it was able to resume its services, albeit limited, and later (33 days after) 
compared to BSP-RO8 (13 days after). Still, the resumption of its operations attest that the 
bureaucracy could stand up to the challenges of severe disasters.  
 
There is a disturbing observation, however, in the case of SSS-TB that is worth discussing, i.e., 
the 30 days leave of its personnel approved by the field office of the Civil Service Commission. 
Although the services of the SSS regional office were not that urgent on Day  as they are not into 
rescue operations, still, being the insurance institution for private employees, their a month-after 
resumption of operations could be belated because disaster victims who are members may have 
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been deprived of time to apply for calamity loans. After 30 days, members whose banks deposits 
or cash had already been depleted, or, unfortunately, inaccessible for some technical or 
administrative reasons, might apply for loans. Having the staff report only after 30 days could have 
caused unnecessarily delays in application processing because the offices had to be restored, and 
its communication systems re-booted.  
 
 




One of the hospitals which was heavily damaged was the Eastern Visayas Regional Medical Centre 
(EVRMC). EVRMC is a regional, tertiary, teaching-training health care facility established in 
1966 with 275 bed capacity. In 2013, it had 389 health manpower complement consisting mainly 
of doctors (27%) and nurses (40%). It is an “apex” hospital or the “end-referral” hospital where 
all the lower health facilities, patient transport services and volunteer emergency responders bring 
their patients for definitive management, especially patients during emergencies and disasters. 
Specifically, during disasters, its functions are as follows: 
 
 Receive all cases or victims of disasters and other calamities;  
 Observe all the requirements and standards needed to respond to emergencies and disasters; 
 Ensure enhancement of the facilities to be responsive to the needs of the communities 
especially during emergencies; 
 Establish and maintain a network with other hospitals in and outside of the area to 
maximize resources and facilitate the smooth and coordinated transferring of victims to the 
appropriate facility or facilities; 
 Report all health emergencies to the Operation Centre for its recognition and possible help, 
if any; and  
 Document all incidents responded to and keep a record of the same.  
 
The involvement of hospitals, including EVRMC, in disaster operations are based on the following 
law and issuances: 
• Republic Act 10121 –  Philippine Disaster Risk Reduction and Management System Act 
of 2010 
• DOH Administrative Order (AO) 2001-182 - Adoption and Implementation of CODE 
ALERT System for DOH Hospitals during Emergencies and Disasters  
• DOH AO 2004 – 168 - National Policy on Health Emergencies and Disasters  
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• DOH AO 2004–155 - Implementing Guidelines for Managing Mass Casualty  Incidents 
during Emergencies and Disasters  
• DOH AO 2008-0024 - Adoption and Institutionalization of an Integrated Code Alert 
System within the Health Sector  
EVRMC has proven that it is capable of living up to its functions in times of disasters. Prior to the 
November 2013 disaster, the hospital responded to 12 emergency/disaster-related cases, ranging 
from man-made (fire, collision, car falling off from cliff or to canal, landslide, flooding, typhoid 
fever outbreak, search and rescue mission) to natural disasters (earthquake and typhoons) (see 
Annex A).  
 
For outstanding medical contributions to emergency/disaster responses in other areas, EVRMC 
was awarded on October 25, 2013 by the Office of the Civil Defense (OCD) the 2013 Gawad 
Kalasag (Shield) National Award: Best Hospital  (Regional and Training Hospital Category). It 
was barely a month before the super typhoon brought the hospital down.  
Preparations 
 
Having been accustomed to disasters, EVRMC took immediate actions as early as November 6 in 
anticipation of the visit of the super typhoon. The chief of hospital raised the “Code White” alert5 
thru the issuance of Hospital Memorandum No. 189, s. 2013, which instructed the following 
personnel to be present and man their stations during the entire duration of the latter: 
 
 
• Senior House Officer  
• Residents on Duty –  
 Orthopaedic 
 Internal Medicine  
 Family Medicine  
 Ob-Gyn  
 Surgery  
 Eyes, Ear, Nose, Throat  
 Psychiatry  
 On-Scene Response Team (EMTs) – 
composed of 14 doctors and staff 
•  Nurse Supervisor Residents on Duty –  
•  Operating Room Staff and Personnel 
• Institutional Workers 
• Radiologic Technologist 
• Pharmacist 
• Medical Technologist 
• Admitting Unit 
• Ambulance Driver 
• Maintenance Crew 
• Security Guards 
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In addition, all concerned departments/sections/units were instructed to prepare in accordance with 
the alert level, and send flash report of any untoward incidents to the operations center of the 
hospital.  
 
On 7 November 2013, the chief of hospital issued HM No. 192, s. 2013 suspending work starting 
the afternoon of that day until the next day when the super typhoon has made landfall in Tacloban 
City. However, the following units were requested to keep skeletal forces during the entire duration 
of the typhoon visit: admitting, pharmacy, billing and PHC claims unit, cash section, laboratory, 
radiology, and facility and maintenance.  
 
The staff of the Clinical Department was ordered to maintain its working force in support of the 
“Code White” alert or higher level codes. On the day of the visit of the super typhoon, the hospital 




Loss and Damage 
 
However, in spite of all the preparations and its experiences in responding to disasters, the hospital 
became one of the victims of the super typhoon. After the wrath subsided, 5% to 90% of the 
hospital’s buildings/infrastructure were damaged. Its desalinization plant and water treatment plant 
suffered the most. Except for three places, all of the offices got flooded and their equipment were 
either partially or completely destroyed (refer to Table 1). 
 
Table 1: Damage Sustained by Various EVRMC Structures 
 
Building/ Infrastructure % Damage Flooded Equipment 
Damage 
Desalinization Plant 90% Yes 100% 
Waste Water Treatment Plant 80% Yes 100% 
Tropical & Infectious Diseases 
Building 
30% Yes 100% 
SARS (Severe Acute Respiratory 
Syndrome) Building 
50% Yes 100% 
SAO & CN Quarters (housing the 
Offices of the Supervising 
Administrative Officer and Chief 
Nurse) 
30% Yes 100% 
Chief of Hospital Quarters 30% Yes 100% 
Supply Office 25% Yes 100% 
Laundry & Linen Building 40% Yes 50% 
Engineering & Maintenance 15% Yes 50% 
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Building/ Infrastructure % Damage Flooded Equipment 
Damage 
Powerhouse & Generator 15% Yes 100% 
Morgue 50% Yes NA 
Incinerator 50% Yes NA 
Dietary 10% Yes None 
Out-Patient Department 90% Yes Yes 
Administration Building, including 
Pharmacy & Emergency Complex 
10%  Partial 
Main Building (Patients’ Wards) 
• Internal Medicine Ward/Intensive 
Care Unit 
• Internal Medicine Ward/Ob-Gyn 
Ward 
• Paediatrics/Ob-Gyn Ward 
• Operating Room Complex/Labour 
Room/Delivery Room 
• Laboratory 
• Philippine Health Insurance 
Corporation I/Orthopaedic 
• Philippine Health Insurance 




























Source: Ruetas, 2014 
 
 
The hospital’s personnel were also hit hard by the super typhoon. When an unnumbered Hospital 
Memo was issued on November 20 requesting all personnel to report to duty starting November 
25, many failed to show up. Out of the 680 staff, 44% or 301 of them were not able to immediately 
report. Unfortunately, two medical staff and two administrative personnel (1%) died during the 
typhoon’s onslaught. Luckily, 375 personnel (or 54%) went back to duty immediately (see Table 
2). Those who reported struggled to do their jobs in spite of the damages sustained by the hospital 
and its equipment, the shortage of medical supplies, and the bleak conditions in the city.  
 
Table 2: Inventory of EVRMC Staff after the Typhoon 
 
Service Number of 
Staff 
Reported Alive Dead Did not Report 
Medical 93 59 0 34 
Nursing 120 66 1 53 
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Service Number of 
Staff 
Reported Alive Dead Did not Report 
Administrative 93 53 1 39 




13 6 0 7 








169 78 1 91 
Job Orders 135 76 0 59 
Security Guards 15 14 1 0 
Total 664 361 4 301 




In spite of the damages it sustained and loss of lives of its personnel, the hospital continued to 
provide its services as a critical community facility during and after the visit of the super typhoon 
In fact, EVRMC was the last hospital standing in the aftermath of the disaster despite the depleted 
manpower and logistics. The table below shows the dedication of its staff to its oath to serve people 
in dire need of medical assistance even in times of disasters. From 7 to 22 of November, on the 
average, the hospital admitted 42 patients, adding to its in-patients averaging 220 each day. As 
quickly as it admitted patients, the hospital discharged 47 on the average each day. Unfortunately, 
among those admitted during the said period, 49 of them died (see Table 3).  
 
Table 3: Hospital Census, November 7-22, 2013 
 
Date Admissions Discharges Mortality In-Patients 
Nov. 7 56 64 5 331 
Nov. 8 29 3 1 346 
Nov. 9 28 30 4 340 
Nov. 10 51 54 3 334 
Nov. 11 46 62 6 312 
Nov. 12 52 77 2 285 
Nov. 13 37 75 0 247 
Nov. 14 40 106 3 168 
Nov. 15 45 58 4 154 
Nov. 16 29 34 3 146 
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Date Admissions Discharges Mortality In-Patients 
Nov. 17 25 4 4 135 
Nov. 18 35 25 1 125 
Nov. 19 55 30 0 131 
Nov. 20 47 47 3 169 
Nov. 21 49 40 3 164 
Nov. 22 46 48 3 144 
Total 664 757 49 N/A 
Source: Ruetas 2014 
  
 
EVRMC was assisted by many to continuously give medical services immediately after the 
disaster, and to recover immediately from the devastation. These include local governments, local 
hospitals, national government agencies, UN organizations, local and international private 
corporations/foundations and foreign countries.  
 
Continuity Planning for the Future 
 
In reflection, the hospital learned that even though it was a national awardee on disaster response 
that very same year and had lots of experience in responding to disasters in other provinces, it 
lacked plans, effective communication system, transportation system and units, logistics, and 
lifelines. Moreover, it realized the problem of their staff as victim-responders, i.e., they are also 
susceptible to the hazards, hence, may not be able to report immediately to the hospital to perform 
their duties. To address these gaps, EVRMC drafted its Hospital Emergency Preparedness, 
Response, and Recovery Plan (HEPRRP) 2014-2015: Contingency Plan, Business Continuity Plan 
in 2014. The manual “defines the direction of the hospital in preparing for effective and efficient 
response and recovery in any event of emergency or disaster within its facilities and/or its 
catchment area” (EVRMC, 2014). The over-all goal of the new systems put in place is to decrease 
mortality and morbidity in times of disasters. Four plans have been drawn up in details. These are 
the: 
 
• Preparedness Plans - contain strategies and activities that the hospital shall carry out, all 
geared toward the building and enhancing of the hospital capacity to address all types of 
emergencies and on disasters.  
• Response Plans - include the established strategies and activities defining the utilization 
of the hospital resources for an effective and efficient response during emergencies and or 
Public Sector Continuity Planning 
 108 
disasters. This includes specific policies, protocols, guidelines and procedures pertaining 
to various emergency management systems for a more efficient and calculated response.  
• Hospital Recovery or Rehabilitation Plans - include any and all strategies and activities 
which will bring back the hospital to its status quo condition antecedent to the occurrence 
of the emergency and/or calamity in order to prepare the same for any other forthcoming 
eventuality.  
• Contingency Plans - systems and standard operating procedures in establishing and 
sustaining surge capacity of the hospital. Its objective is to maintain continuous hospital 
operation during disaster.  
• Business Continuity Plan - includes systems and standard operating procedures on how 
to continue critical functions of the hospital without interruptions. It contains logistical 
plans with strategies, mechanisms, arrangements, systems and procedures on how to 
continue operations. Includes support to operation in terms of resources such as manpower, 
logistics, finances, information, lifelines and accommodation, among others.  
 
Systems and procedures were also drawn up for to verify reports of impending hazards/disasters, 
management of victims in the “tent emergency room,” standard operating procedures on the 
conversion of the hospital’s parking lot into triage, collection and treatment area, and mechanism 
for the activation of the plan for external disasters.  
 
The hospital created its EVRM Planning Committee with the Chief of the Medical Centre, as the 
chairman, (alternative is the HEMS Coordinator), with members composed of the heads of the various 
clinical departments or their representatives, i.e., the administrative officer, the chief nurse, the security 
officer, head of the maintenance division or their representatives.  
 
Analysis: The case study above has shown that EVRMC’s bureaucracy is well-experienced in 
dealing with emergency situations. However, its high level of preparedness, and long years of 
experience in dealing with emergency situations, as fully narrated above, were of no match to the 
power of the super typhoon. Still, it persevered to serve the people of the Eastern Visayas region 
even though the hospital itself was handicapped by the damage to its building, equipment, and 
facilities, and casualties and injuries to its personnel. Like OCD-RO8, it deals directly with disaster 
victims. It lived up to expectations when it continued its operations during and immediately the 
disaster has struck.  
 
Institutionalizing Public Service Continuity Planning in the Philippines 
 
On 10 April 2018, the NDRMC, through its Memorandum No. 33, s. 2018, called on all 
government member-agencies of the council at all levels and other government departments, 
offices, bureaus, services, units, and instrumentalities to develop their own Public Service 
Continuity Plans (PSCPs). This was after a decision was made at the 4th Meeting of the Cabinet 
Cluster on Climate Change Adaptation, Mitigation, and Disaster Risk Reduction “to guarantee the 
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continuity of operations amidst disruptions.” The concept of the PSCP was developed through the 
joint-collaboration of the OCD, NDRRMC TWG, and Philippine Disaster Resilience Foundation 
(PDRF). 
 
A PSCP is officially defined as “a document containing strategies and mechanisms of a 
government agency/ organization to ensure continuous delivery of services to the public amidst 
any disruption” (NDRRMC-PDRF, 2018). Specifically, PSCPs are drawn to:  
 
• Ensure continued performance of essential functions – essential functions are those 
services that must be delivered amidst any disruption; 
• Minimize damage and loss to critical processes – critical processes are all internal to your 
organization; 
• Ensure succession if agency leadership is disrupted – such will allow continuity of 
leadership roles by having backup leadership positions; 
• Reduce or mitigate disruptions to operations – your government agency can still perform 
your mandated roles; 
• Ensure facilities for performance of essential functions – the infrastructure and facility 
requirements will be in place so that you can perform your essential functions; 
• Protect essential facilities and resources – aside from essential functions, the facilities and 
resources that support the performance of your essential functions are also secured from 
the threats; 
• Achieve a timely and orderly recovery; 
• Resume full service to customers; and 
• Maintain a test, training, and exercise program (NDRRMC-PDRF, 2018).  
 
 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
 
Theoretically speaking, the literature points out that the strengths of the Weberian model of ideal-
type of bureaucracy is also its weakness during times of emergencies. The Weber-inspired 
bureaucracy assumes a stable condition such that it creates its bureaucratic norms which makes it 
inflexible to respond immediately to emergent norms of disaster victims who need help to cope 
Ebinezer R. Florano is Associate Professor and Director of the Center for Policy and Executive Development 
in the National College of Public Administration and Governance, University of the Philippines, Quezon City, 
Philippines. E-mail: erflorano@up.edu.ph 
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with their personal losses and the destruction in their environment. Hence, gaps between the 
government’s bureaucratic norm and the victims’ emergent norms develop. These gaps may still 
widen depending on the nature and power of the disasters, the preparedness of the governmental 
response systems, and people’s orientation and behavior towards disasters and their government. 
The four cases somehow bring light to these observations. 
 
The four cases give an overview of four important findings for possible future research. First, from 
the case of OCD-RO8, it can be hypothesized that the more the clients a government agency 
services, the less it will be able to focus on securing its office due to the enormity of its tasks and 
the wide base of its clients. Second, in the case of SSS-TB, the overzealousness of the management 
to give its personnel lengthy time to recover from their own devastations in their families may 
hinder the immediate restoration of public service. Third, the quick post-disaster recovery of BSP-
RO8 proves that a continuity plan initiated by the top management was a decisive factor in the 
resumption of its services. Lastly, the case of EVRMC has shown that years of experience in 
disaster/emergency response may not be enough to withstand powerful hazards in the “Age of the 
New Normal.” Hence, continuity planning for various disaster scenarios may still prove to be 




1 This is based primarily on an interview with OCD-RO8 Regional Director Rey Gozon, April 
2015. 
2 This is based primarily on interviews with various officials of BSP-RO8, April 2015. 
3 This is based primarily on an interview with BSP-TC Head Lilibeth Cajucom, April 2015. 
4 This is based primarily on an interview with Dr. Lory Ruetas, April 2015. 
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